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BOARD OF EDUCATION, LEVITTOWN UNION
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. NYQUIST:
A RETURN TO FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION
IN SCHOOL FINANCING CASES
I
INTRODUCTION

Since 1968, courts in sixteen states' have considered challenges to public
school financing laws. In each case plaintiffs charged that reliance on local
property taxes to support public education discriminated against children in
school districts where property values were relatively low. School districts with
little valuable real estate complained that although they were compelled to
impose higher than average tax rates to raise necessary school revenues, they
were unable to match the spending of school districts with wealthier tax bases.
Courts in eight states invalidated state-wide school funding schemes as discriminatory2 under various state constitutional provisions 3 and the United States
Constitution's equal protection clause. 4 In eight other states the courts upheld
1. The 16 states with school financing adjudications, in chronological order, are Illinois (1968),
Virginia (1969), California (1971), Minnesota (1971), Kansas (1972). Texas (1973). New Jersey
(1973), Arizona (1973), Michigan (1973), Washington (1974), Idaho (1975), Oregon (1976),
Connecticut (1977), Ohio (1977), New York (1978), and Colorado (1979). For citations to each of
the rulings, see notes 2 & 5 infra.
2. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Caldwell v. Kansas, No. 50616 (Johnson County
Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. v.
Essex, No. A7602725 (Ct. of C.P., Hamilton County, Dec. 5, 1977); Board of Educ., Levittown
Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Lujan v.
Colorado State Bd. of Educ., No. C73688 (Dist. Ct., Denver, Mar. 13, 1979).
3. In California, Connecticut, Ohio, New York, and Colorado, equal protection provisions of
the state constitutions provided grounds for invalidation. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584. 596 n.1 I,
487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 n.11 (1971); Horton v. Meskill. 172 Conn. 615,
649, 376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (1977); Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. v. Essex, No. A7602725. Judgment (Ct.
of C.P., Hamilton County, Dec. 5, 1977); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v.
Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 525, 527, 530, 535, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606. 638-39, 641, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1978);
Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., No. C73688. Judgment (Dist. Ct., Denver, Mar. 13. 1979).
In New Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio, and New York, state constitutional provisions mandating operation of public schools provided grounds for invalidation. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 515,
303 A.2d 273, 295, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 649, 376
A.2d 359, 374-75 (1977); Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. v. Essex, No. A7602725, Judgment (Ct. of C.P.,
Hamilton County, Dec. 5, 1977); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist,
94 Misc. 2d 466, 528, 534, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 640, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
4. In California, Minnesota, New York, and Colorado. invalidation was based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 614-15, 487 P.2d 1241, 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 623 (1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
334 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v.
87
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5
school financing schemes.
In the pivotal case of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez ,6 the United States Supreme Court rejected claims that the Texas
school financing system violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Following the Rodriguez decision in 1973, the focus in school finance litigation shifted from the federal equal protection clause to state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws or a right to education itself. It was not until 1978 that a court once again relied upon the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution in a school financing deci-7
sion. In Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist,
Justice L. Kingsley Smith of the Nassau County Supreme Court in New York
declared the state's school financing statute invalid under both the New York
and the United States Constitutions. The Levittown court ruled on state constitutional grounds alone that there existed an unwarranted link between property
wealth and school spending. The court's federal equal protection ruling came
on the separate question whether the school districts of New York's largest cities were treated unfairly due to the effects of "municipal overburden" on the
cities' educational spending. Municipal overburden is the cumulative weight of
inexorable demands for municipal services outside the educational sphere; its
effect is to leave a relatively small share of urban property tax revenues for
public education. On the issues of municipal overburden and a number of other
"burdens" unique to large city school districts, the Levittown court found the
Rodriguez holding distinguishable, and ruled that the New York system violates the federal equal protection clause.
This Comment begins with an extensive summary of the Levittown litigation and the New York court's findings of fact, followed by a description and
analysis of the court's conclusions of law. The Comment concludes with a brief
discussion of the remedial task confronting the state legislature.

Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 523, 535, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 642, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Lujan v. Colorado
State Bd. of Educ., No. C73688, Judgment (Dist. Ct., Denver, Mar. 13, 1979).
The United States Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), repudiated the fourteenth amendment reasoning in the California and
Minnesota cases. See text accompanying notes 94-116 infra. The California decision, however,
rested on adequate and independent state grounds, i.e., the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution, and was therefore unaffected by Rodriguez. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d
728, 762-68, 557 P.2d 929, 949-53, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 365-69 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977). The Minnesota decision, although repudiated, has never been explicitly overruled. In the
New York case, Rodriguez was distinguished. Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist.
v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 531, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 641-42 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
5. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub norn., McInnis
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'dper
curim, 397 U.S. 44 (1970); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212
N.W.2d 711 (1973); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178
(1974); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554
P.2d 139 (1976).
6. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). For a summary of the Rodriguez facts and holdings, see text accompanying notes 94-116 infra.
7. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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II
SCHOOL FINANCING IN NEW YORK
To comprehend the Levittown dispute it is necessary to understand the
New York school financing scheme. 8 In each school district, a portion of

school operating expenses is paid by the state; most of the remainder is paid
from the school districts' own property tax revenues. 9 At the time of the

Levittown trial, the aid statute's primary formula guaranteed that school districts which imposed a fifteen mill tax on the property within their borders
would receive enough state aid to bring their total revenues to $1200 per pupil
annually.10 Districts with relatively greater property wealth per pupil received
proportionally less aid from the state, because a fifteen mill local tax would
bring the wealthier districts nearer the $1200 per pupil guaranteed minimum.
The state's contribution was thus inversely tied to the school districts' property

wealth per pupil: the greater the property wealth per pupil, the smaller the

state's contribution.
School districts were free to tax their real property at rates higher than fifteen mills, and many did, thereby raising expenditures on their own beyond the
$1200 minimum. The state's contribution, however, was computed as if the tax
rate in every district were fifteen mills. A significant minority of New York's
school districts could receive no state aid at all under the primary formula be8. The Levittown court passed on the validity of New York's school financing statute as
amended in 1974, the year the lawsuit was initiated. The statute was subsequently amended in 1977
and 1978, prior to the court's judgment on December 22, 1978. The amendments did not alter the
overall design of the system. The discussion of the statute in this Comment will refer to the 1974
version, which was the object of the court's examination. Pertinent differences and similarities between the 1974 and 1978 versions will be mentioned in the footnotes. See 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 241,
§ 8; 1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 71, § 7 (current version at N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3602(11), (12) (McKinney
Supp. 1978-1979)).
9. Federal aid to education has historically made up a sufficiently small proportion of total
school funds in New York that it may be disregarded for purposes of this Comment. Federal aid
has amounted to less than five percent of the state's school expenditures in most years. By contrast, at the time of the Levittown trial, state aid made up 40% of school expenditures. Findings of
Fact (Plaintiffs) at 24, Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d
466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
10. 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 241, § 8. A tax of 15 mills is a tax of S.015 on each dollar of a property's assessed value. School districts with tax rates of less than 15 mills were likely to have total
revenues of less than $1200 per pupil because the state distributed aid as if districts were taxing at
15 mills. The statute even penalized districts for taxing at rates below 15 mills by reducing their
state aid. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602(14)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). Evidence presented at trial
indicated that the district with the lowest combined state and local revenues spent annually S936
per pupil. Levittown, 94 Misc. 2d at 489, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
The 1977 amendments raised the guaranteed minimum amount per pupil from S1200 to SI400.
1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 71, § 7. The 1978 amendments raised the minimum to S1450 per pupil, and
discarded the 15 mill tax rate standard. The new formula enacted in 1978 utilizes a different property wealth standard, the state average of property wealth per pupil. Under the new formula, districts whose property wealth is equivalent to the state's average are granted 49% of S1450 per
pupil, or $710.50 per pupil. Districts above the state average receive proportionally less state aid,
and districts below the state average receive proportionally more. N.Y. EDUc. LAW §
3602(1 1)(b)-(f) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
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cause they had sufficient property wealth to produce more than $1200 per pupil
from a fifteen mill levy."' Such wealthy districts, however, were not overlooked by the aid statute. They all received state funds under the statute's "flat
grant" provision, which assured that every district, no matter how wealthy,
would receive some state aid. Under the flat grant, no district received less
than $360 per pupil from the state, even where high property wealth rendered
districts ineligible for aid under the primary formula. 1 2 The effect of the flat
grant was largely to negate the equalizing effect of the main state aid formula.
A third method of computing state aid, optional to all districts, allowed a
majority to exceed the aid available under either the main formula or the flat
grant. School districts could elect to receive funds according to either of two
"save harmless" provisions, t3 designed to prevent decreases in state aid to individual districts. Under the "per pupil save harmless" provision, districts
were assured of receiving at least as much state aid per pupil each year as they
received the preceding year.1 4 The per pupil save harmless provision benefited districts in which real estate values were appreciating rapidly. Without the
save harmless provision, the rise in property values would have resulted in an
increase in property wealth per pupil, which would trigger a decrease in the
state's contribution to the district's guaranteed $1200 per pupil. The "total save
harmless" provision, on the other hand, assured districts of receiving at least
as much total state aid each year as they received the preceding year.' 5 Total
save harmless was important for districts experiencing declining student enrollments. Without save harmless, the decline would have resulted in an increase
in per pupil property wealth, which would cause a decrease in state aid.
Rising real estate values and declining enrollments became so widespread
in New York during the early and mid-1970's that by 1977, 699 of New York's
708 school districts were electing one or the other of the save harmless provisions over the primary formula and the flat grant. 1 6 The effect of nearly universal reliance on save harmless provisions had been to subvert the self-adjusting
operation of the statute's primary formula, which was designed to adjust the
state's contribution downward in districts which showed increased property
wealth per pupil. In a save harmless system a district's state aid can be adjusted upward but never downward.
Another feature of the school aid statute pertinent to the Levittown case
concerned the determination of the number of pupils in each district. When a
district had computed the amount of state aid per pupil to which it was entitled, it multiplied that figure by the number of pupils in the district to find its
11. Over 10% of New York's school districts were in this category. The court cited evidence
that the "wealthiest" school district in the state had property wealth of $412,370 for each pupil in
its school system. Levittown, 94 Misc. 2d at 486, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 615. A 15 mill tax on $412,370
would yield $6185 per pupil, more than five times the guaranteed $1200 per pupil.
12. 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 241, § 8 (current version at N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602(12)(d)
(McKinney Supp. 1978-1979)).
13. Id. (current version at N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602(18)(a)(2) & (3) (McKinney Supp. 19781979)).
14. Id. (current version at N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602(18)(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979)).

15. Id. (current version at N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602(18)(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979)).
16.

94 Misc. 2d at 485, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 614; Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs), supra note 9, at 23.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

1978-1979]

SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM

total operating aid. Some pupils, however, were "weighted," i.e., they were
treated as more than one pupil. For example, each elementary school pupil
counted as 1.0 pupil, each secondary school pupil counted as 1.25 pupils, and
each handicapped pupil counted as 2.0 pupils.' 7 The pupil weightings represented a judgment by the legislature that some groups of pupils are more expensive to educate than others.
Finally, the statute defined the number of pupils in a school district as the
number who were in attendance on an average school day,18 and not the total
number who were enrolled. The effect of an average daily attendance measure
of school population was to understate population and put a premium on high
student attendance. The fewer students a district appeared to have, the greater
property wealth per pupil it would show.
III
THE CASE

The Levittown suit was brought by a group of New York State school districts and school children [hereinafter referred to as "original plaintiffs" or
"plaintiffs"] against the State Commissioner of Education in June of 1974.19
Shortly thereafter, a second group of school districts and children [hereinafter
referred to as "plaintiffs-intervenors" or "intervenors"] requested and were
granted permission to intervene as plaintiffs in the action. 20 Most of the original
plaintiff school districts could be characterized as suburban or rural; the four
intervenor districts were those of the four largest cities in New York.2 1 The
two groups of plaintiffs offered distinct but overlapping analyses of the relevant
facts and the applicable law. The significant differences in the impact of the
financing system upon urban and suburban school districts necessitated separate approaches to the case.
A.

Origizal Plaintiffs

The original plaintiffs' challenge was directed at the close relationship between school spending and property wealth. They presented evidence of wide
17. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602(9), (9-a) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). The other pupil weightings
in the statute were as follows: pupils with special educational needs. 1.25 pupils; summer session
pupils, 1.12 pupils; and evening school pupils, 1.50 pupils. Id. § 3602(9).
18. Id. § 3602(8).

19. The original group of plaintiffs was made up of 27 school districts in various parts of the
state and 12 school children. In addition to the Commissioner of Education, the defendants were
the University of the State of New York, the State Comptroller, and the State Commissioner of
Taxation and Finance.
20. The intervening group of plaintiffs was made up of four urban school districts, 17 school
children, New York City, the mayor of New York City, the mayor of Syracuse, the director of the
New York City Bureau of the Budget, the United Parents Associations of New York, Inc., the superintendents and presidents of the school boards of the intervenor school districts, and a taxpayer.
21. The intervenor school districts were New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse.
One district, the city school district of Buffalo, was both an original plaintiff and a plaintiffintervenor.
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variations in property wealth per pupil among the school districts in New
York. 22 They showed also that school spending per pupil varied significantly
23
around the state despite the ameliorative impact of the state aid formula.
Third, the plaintiffs proved a close relation between the first two sets of facts:
levels of expenditures were directly tied to property wealth. 24 To demonstrate
that the plaintiff school children were harmed by the relationship, the original
plaintiffs offered proof that differences in expenditures gave rise to important
differences in the educational services provided by the schools. 25 The plaintiff
school districts showed, for example, that they operated with generally larger
class sizes, less curricular breadth, and fewer programs
for disadvantaged or
26
specially gifted students than did wealthier districts.
The original plaintiffs argued that these facts established a denial of the
rights of plaintiff school children under the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution, 27 the equal protection clause of the New York Constitution,28 and the education article of the New York Constitution. 29 To sum-

marize briefly, the original group of plaintiffs demanded a financing system in
which the amount spent on a child's education would not depend upon property values in the child's community.
B. Plaintiffs-Intervenors
Although the plaintiffs-intervenors recognized the inequitable effect of
using property taxes as a basis for school funding, they challenged the means
selected by the state to equalize school spending, i.e., providing additional
state aid to the districts with low property wealth. 30 The intervening large city
school districts had property wealth figures that were high in comparison with
the rest of the state because their boundaries contained some of the most valuable real estate in the world. The state's contribution to their resources for education was correspondingly low. 3 1 The intervenors alleged, however, that
inner-city schools were among those most desperately in need of additional as22.

Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs), supra note 9, at 25-28. The court adopted with minor changes

the proposed findings of fact submitted by the original plaintiffs as well as those submitted by the
plaintiffs-intervenors. For convenience, all references herein to factual showings by either group of
plaintiffs will be cited to the court's Findings of Fact.
23.
24.

Id. at 28-30.
Id. at 30-35.

25. Id. at 36-76.
26.

Id. at 38-42, 49-57, 67-70.

27. The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution provides, "nor shall any State
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
28. The equal protection clause of the New York Constitution provides in part that -[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." N.Y.
CONST.

art. I, § II.

29. The education article of the New York Constitution provides that "[t]he legislature shall
provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
30. Plaintiffs-Intervenors' Amended Complaint § 5(A)(24), at 2-3, Board of Educ., Levittown
Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
31. Id.
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sistance.3 2 They sought to demonstrate that property wealth was an unreliable
gauge of local capacity to support public schools, particularly in the large cities
of the state. The intervenors presented evidence of a number of factors responsible for distorting their ability to pay for education:
(1) Municipal overburden. Although the cities had much larger tax bases
than other school districts, the cities had also vastly greater non-school expenditures. 33 The intervenors' evidence showed that the cities must devote far
greater proportions of their local tax revenues to police and fire protection,
welfare, health care, mass transit, parks, and public housing than other locali34
ties.
(2) Reduced purchasing power. The higher cost of living and higher general wage scales in urban centers reduced the purchasing power of each dollar
35
spent for city schools.
(3) The pupil attendance measure. Use of average total enrollment to compute property wealth per pupil resulted in exaggeration of wealth in urban districts due to their relatively high absenteeism levels. The consequence of exaggerated property wealth was reduced state aid. 36
(4) Special-need pupil weightings. Weightings which increased aid for
special-need pupils were applied to per pupil aid figures already reduced by
municipal overburden, reduced purchasing power, and high absenteeism, resulting in smaller state aid supplements for each special-need pupil. 37
(5) Educational overburdens. The cities had the greatest concentrations of
pupils who were difficult to educate, and therefore more expensive to educate.
The intervenors demonstrated that discrimination in school spending had
affected the quality of education in the cities. Unlike the original plaintiffs,
however, who pointed to differences in school services between wealthy and
poor districts, 38 the intervenors showed that the urban districts lagged far behind the rest of the state in pupil achievement.
On the law, the intervenors' case mirrored that of the original plaintiffs,
alleging violations of the state and federal equal protection clauses and the
state constitution's education article. To summarize, the plaintiffs-intervenors
called for a financing system in which state aid would be allocated on the basis
of each district's true capacity to support its schools. To the extent that finding
such true capacity would require investigating factors other than property
wealth, such as municipal overburden, the plaintiffs-intervenors and the origi32. Id. § 6(38)-(41).
33. Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs-Intervenors) at 2-3, Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free
School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
34. Id. at 8, 10-15.
35. Id. at 20-21.
36. Id. at 24.
37. Id. at 29. Each handicapped pupil, for example, was counted as two pupils, i.e.. the
handicapped pupil weighting was 100%. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3602(9) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
The intervenors claimed that because per pupil aid was artificially reduced by municipal overbur-

den and other factors, the 100% additional aid per each handicapped pupil was likewise distorted.
See Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs-Intervenors), supra note 33. at 29.
38. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
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nal plaintiffs were fundamentally adverse parties. If the property-rich large cities were entitled to greater state aid on account of municipal overburden and
other factors, they could receive such aid only to the relative detriment of
other school districts, many of which were low on the property wealth scale.
IV
THE COURT'S FINDINGS

A.

OriginalPlaintiffs

The Levittown court adopted, with some changes, the proposed findings of
fact submitted by the original plaintiffs. The court made all four of the findings
that were fundamental to the plaintiffs' case: (1) school districts had vastly unequal access to taxable property wealth; (2) school spending per pupil varied
widely among school districts; (3) disparities in property wealth and in educational spending were strongly connected; and (4) expenditure disparities had
meaningful educational and non-educational consequences.
The court found that the wealthiest school district in the state had more
than fifty-two times the property wealth per pupil of the poorest district.3 9
Gross differences in property wealth, however, were not confined to a few
very wealthy and a few very poor school districts. A majority of the state's
school children were found to live in districts that were more than twenty-five
percent above or below the average in property wealth per pupil.4o Disregarding the wealthiest ten percent and the poorest ten percent of the state's
school districts, the ratio of the richest to the poorest school district was still
greater than four-to-one. 41 Wide disparities were found within individual coun42
ties as well as throughout the state.
Turning to disparities in expenditures, the court found the ratio of the
highest to the lowest district in school spending per pupil to be four-and-onehalf to one.4 3 Spending variations, like wealth variations, were not limited to
the richest versus the poorest school districts. When the highest ten percent
and the lowest ten percent were eliminated, some districts still spent twice as
39. The most recent property wealth statistics before the court were from the 1975-76 school
year. The 52-to-i ratio in property wealth had widened from a 46-to-I ratio in the 1974-75 school
year, when the wealthiest district, Fisher's Island, had $412,370 in property wealth per pupil, and
the poorest district, Salmon River, had $8,884 per pupil. Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs), supra note 9
at 25, 27.

40. The wealthiest 25% of school districts had property wealth exceeding $61,870 per pupil; the
poorest 25% had less than $37,122 per pupil. Id. at 26.
41. The school district at the 90th percentile had property wealth of over $86,000 per pupil; the
district at the 10th percentile had $20,840 per pupil. Id. at 25.
42. Nassau County had three districts, Manhasset, North Shore, and Great Neck, with property
wealth over $124,000 per pupil, and three other districts, Levittown, Roosevelt, and North

Merrick, below $30,000 per pupil. Suffolk County had three districts with more than $370,000 per
pupil, and three districts below $27,000 per pupil. Westchester County had one district over
$330,000 per pupil, and others below $37,000 per pupil. Id. at 26.
43. The highest spending school district had annual expenditures of $4,215 per pupil; the lowest
spending district spent $936 per pupil. Id. at 28.
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much per student as others. 44 Sixty-three percent of the state's school districts
twenty-five percent more or twenty-five percent less than the
spent at4 least
5
average.

The court found that the plaintiffs had proved a strong direct correlation
between property wealth disparities and expenditure disparities among the
school districts. 4 6 Eighty percent of spending variations were attributable to
differences in property wealth.4 7 Linkage was evident at every level of wealth
and spending. 48 Most importantly, the court found that the statutory financing
scheme itself explicitly linked wealth and spending. 49 The statute assumed the
same fifteen mill tax rate for all districts receiving aid under the main formula.
Given the vast differences in property wealth among school districts, a uniform
fifteen mill tax rate would necessarily produce greatly varying local revenues.
The court found that despite the equalizing effect of the statute's primary formula, the legislative scheme enabled wealthy districts to achieve high levels of
spending that were difficult or impossible for poorer districts to attain.-"
The court also found evidence of a number of significant consequences of
spending differentials, many of them non-educational. Districts low in property
wealth found it necessary to impose higher than average tax rates.5' The court
found that in one school district the increased tax burden had led to an
unusually high incidence of foreclosures on mortgages and had operated as an
incentive for residents to move out of the district. -2 In another district, voters
forcing the district to operate on a
had defeated two proposed school budgets,
3
"contingency" or "austerity" budget.The educational consequences of spending variations were more numerous. Low-spending school districts were found to have significantly lower ratios of teachers and other professionals to students. 4 Larger classes were the
result.5 5 The court noted that the apparent lack of agreement among educational experts concerning the relation, if any, between class size and academic
achievement did not preclude a finding of denial of meaningful educational opportunities where it was shown that wealthy districts could provide small clas44. The school district at the 90th percentile spent S2,051 per pupil; the district at the 10th percentile spent $1,089 per pupil. Id. at 28-29.
45. See id. at 29.
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id. at 32.
48. Id. at 31-32.
49. Id. at 32.
50. Id. at 32-35. A 15 mill tax in the state's wealthiest district would yield more than six thousand dollars per pupil. The same tax rate in the state's poorest district would yield S133 per pupil.
The district at the 90th percentile in property wealth would generate SI.283 per pupil with a 15 mill
tax, and the district at the 10th percentile would raise S314 per pupil. Id. at 33.
51. Id. at 36.
52. The court found as well that homes vacated by families leaving the district had been converted from single family occupancy to double and triple family occupancy, compounding the drain
on educational resources. Id.
53. Id. at 37.
54. Id. at 38.
55. Id. at 40-41.
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ses when they were deemed desirable, but poor districts could not offer them
under any circumstances.5 6 The court also found that poorer districts' professional staff deficiencies prevented them from offering the breadth and variety
of curricula available in wealthier districts.1 7 Districts with low expenditures
generally were unable to provide advanced placement courses for gifted secondary school students, variety or extended study in foreign language offerings,
adequate instruction in art and music, and supplemental educational experiences such as field trips. 5" These were curriculum offerings that were routinely
made available in wealthy school districts."

Certain teacher characteristics were found to differ between wealthy and
poor districts. Statistics showed that high-spending school districts hired teaching staffs with more experience and more graduate degrees, characteristics
which must be paid for in the form of higher salaries. 60 Sociological evidence
showed a direct correlation between teacher experience and advanced degrees
on the one hand and pupil achievement on the other. 6' In addition, the court
found that low spending districts compared poorly with wealthy districts in
numbers of guidance counsellors, school psychologists, and speech therapists;
age and condition of instructional equipment; and quantities of basic school
62
supplies and textbooks.

56. Id. at 41. The court made specific findings that wealthy districts uniformly took advantage
of their high levels of expenditure to reduce class sizes. In courses where more than specified maximum numbers of students enrolled, wealthy districts were able to create additional sections rather
than turn students away or increase class size. Wealthy districts maintained their smallest classes
for advanced placement and remedial courses. If few students signed up for advanced or remedial
courses, enrollments in wealthy districts were allowed to drop below normal minimums to avoid
dropping such courses entirely.
Administrators and teachers from wealthy school districts testified at trial to the following reasons for maintaining small classes: (I) Teachers and parents generally believe small classes are
educationally desirable, and it is important to please both groups. (2) In classes of more than 25
students, teachers lose track of individual students' problems. (3) Individualized instruction in the
early years of school promotes a healthy self-image for the pupil. (4) Classes for disadvantaged
pupils or those with learning disabilities are effective only when they are small. (5) Advanced classes in languages, sciences, and math must be small because few students enroll. (6) Advanced
placement courses require greater teacher preparation and individualized instruction. (7) Instruction
in English composition requires time-consuming evaluation of students' papers. (8) Science laboratory courses must be small so that each student can actually perform experiments. Id. at 42-49.
57.

Id. at 49.

58. The plaintiff Levittown Union Free School District had abandoned advanced placement
programs due to their cost, and had eliminated foreign language study in the junior high schools.
Plaintiff Roosevelt School District employed no art or music specialists for the elementary grades.
Teachers in Levittown planned very few field trips because they disliked asking students to pay
part of the cost. Id. at 50-58.
59. Id. at 51-52, 55-58. The Great Neck School District offered advanced placement courses in
English, American and European history, calculus, biology, chemistry, physics, French, Latin, and
Spanish. The Half Hollow Hills School District offered junior high instruction in French, Spanish,
German, and Italian, with a possible six-year sequence in each language, and had offered independent study in Hebrew, Latin, Japanese, Modern Greek, and Portuguese. Id. at 5I, 56.
60. Id. at 59.
61. The court pointed out that it was not clear whether teacher experience and education affect
student achievement or are merely proxies for other characteristics which do. Id. at 61-62.
62. Id. at 63-76.
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B. Plaintiffs-Intervenors

The court adopted the plaintiffs-intervenors' proposed findings of fact with
some changes. The court found in favor of the intervenors on each of the major
factual points in their case. First, the aid statute's underlying equalization purpose was defeated by four circumstances that diminished the large cities' educational resources: municipal overburden, reduced purchasing power, the pupil
attendance measure of school population, and reduced supplemental aid for
special-need pupils. Second, the aid formula disregarded the city schools' severe educational overburdens with the result that their pupils' serious achievement deficiencies were not ameliorated.
The court found initially that the intervenors' fiscal capacity was exaggerated by municipal overburden, or the burden of non-educational services which
large cities must finance by property taxes. The evidence showed that the cities
devoted far greater amounts per capita than did suburban and rural
communities to non-educational expenditures, and that the cities set aside significantly smaller proportions of their local revenues for schools, although they
had substantially higher overall tax rates.6 3 The court proceeded to find that
the cities' higher non-educational expenditures had been undertaken in response to demands that were so compelling that they could not be ignored.
Some physical and population characteristics of New York's cities which made
higher municipal spending necessary were their large proportions of young, old,
poor, and less educated persons; high unemployment; dense population; old
and deteriorated housing stock; and old and heavily used street, sewer, and
water systems. 64 The cities were powerless to influence population migrations,65 and could improve their physical facilities only at great expense. The
court found that cities could not ignore the need for large police forces to deal
with high urban crime rates, millions of commuters and tourists, major public
events, and organized crime. 66 Nor could volunteer fire departments adequately serve the major cities as they do other communities. 67 The court found
the operation of New York City's mass transit system to be essential to the
city's functioning.6 8 Much of the cities' responsibility in the provision of cor63. Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs-Intervenors), supra note 33. at 2. For example, in 1974 New
York City's per capita locally financed expenditures excluding education were more than double
those for the balance of the state. In the 1972-73 school year, the four intervenor cities devoted
28.3% of their locally raised revenues to schools, while the remainder of the state spent 45. 1% of
local revenues for schools. Id. at 2-3. The intervenor cities' property tax rates were just below the
constitutional maximum. Id. at 19. See N.Y. CONsT. art. VIII, § 10(b) & (0.
64. Findings of Fact (PIaintiffs-Intervenors), supra note 33, at 3-5.
65. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1964), the Supreme Court recognized the fundamental constitutional right of interstate travel. The Court held constitutionally impermissible a legislafive purpose of discouraging migration of indigent persons to a state. 394 U.S. at 629-31. See also
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1965).
66. The intervenor cities' per capita expenditures for police were from two to six times the
amounts spent by their suburbs for police. New York City's violent crime rate in 1974 was 14
times that of Long Island's Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs-Intervenors),
supra note 33, at 8-9.

67. Id. at 10.
68. Id. at 13. New York City's annual per capita expenditures for mass transit were more than
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rectional facilities, health care, housing, and welfare was found to be mandated
by state69and federal statutes and regulations over which the cities exercised no
control.
Turning to the matter of reduced purchasing power in urban districts, the
court found that the school aid formula's failure to account for regional cost
70
differences caused the intervenors' financial capacity to be overstated again.
The cost of living in metropolitan areas was higher than in rural areas, and educational costs were found to parallel consumer costs. 71 Likewise, wage scales in
private employment were higher in the cities, and teaching salaries were found
to conform to the private sector pattern. 72 The evidence showed that most
teachers preferred not to work in large city districts due to their large classes,
high proportions of minority and disadvantaged pupils, deteriorating buildings,
limited materials and supplies, violence, and vandalism. 73 The cities could
maintain teacher quality amid these obstacles only by offering relatively high
74
teacher salaries.
The court found as well that use of a pupil attendance measure of school
population deprived the cities of millions of dollars in state aid to which they
would be entitled under a total enrollment measure. 75 Due to their high rates of
absenteeism, the cities' school populations were understated more than those
in other districts by the average daily attendance count. 7 6 The result of their
appearing to have fewer pupils was that the intervenor districts showed greater
property wealth per pupil, and were therefore eligible for less state aid per
pupil. The diminished pupil count affected the aid computation a second time
when the already reduced per pupil aid figure was multiplied by the number of
pupils in the district to determine the aggregate state aid for the district. The
court found that 77
the intervenor schools were thus doubly penalized for their
high absenteeism.
five times those of the rest of the state. Of the three million persons who commute to the center of
New York City each day, 56% use mass transit. Id.
69. Id. at 11-12, 14. For example, the intervenor cities' public assistance obligations are not

within their control. Eligibility for welfare and the kinds and levels of benefits payable to those eligible are fixed by federal and state law. Id. at i1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-603 (1976); N.Y. Soc. SERv.
LAW §§ 86-a, 88, 91-93, 131-133 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1977-1978).
70. Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs-Intervenors), supra note 33, at 20.
71. The New York City metropolitan area was second in the United States only to Boston in
the cost of living. In New York State, the average per pupil expenditure necessary to provide a
minimum educational program was 29% higher in metropolitan area districts than in rural districts.
Id.
72. In the 1974-75 school year, the average classroom teacher's salary was 30% higher in the
New York City metropolitan area than upstate. The large differential was due not only to attractive
salaries in alternative occupations in the metropolitan areas, but also to the greater concentration
of school districts, all of which competed for teachers. Id. at 20-21.
73. Id. at 21.
74. Id. at 21-22.
75. Id. at 24.
76. The state's five largest cities had an average daily attendance rate of 84%; the remainder of
the state averaged 93.83%. Id.
77. The court rejected the defendants' contention that the aid penalty was an effective spur to
school districts to improve their attendance rates. The cities' high absenteeism rates were found to
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With regard to supplemental state aid for handicapped and special-need
students, the court found that the large cities were subject to further discriminination. Multiplying the weightings for handicapped and special-need pupils by
the cities' already-reduced per pupil aid resulted in a reduced state aid supplement for each pupil. If the cities' basic per pupil aid computation had taken account of municipal overburden, reduced purchasing power, and the higher absenteeism rates in the cities, then supplemental aid for special-need pupils could
have been fairly calculated. The cities had greater concentrations of
handicapped and special-need pupils and therefore received the greatest total
supplemental aid, but their "advantage" was illusory because the supplemental
aid for each handicapped and special-need pupil was improperly reduced by applying the weightings to per pupil aid figures that were too low. The discrimination was found to affect fifty-two percent of the state's handicapped and specialneed students, who attended school in the four intervenor cities, where only
thirty-six percent of all the state's pupils resided. 78
The court also found that the intervenors had satisfactorily proved that
their schools operate under eight "educational overburdens," or barriers to
learning, which the state aid statute failed to address. 79 The educational overburdens were poverty-related characteristics of many city school pupils which
the court found made their achievement of normal progress in school extremely
unlikely, including:
(1) Impaired learning readiness. Many children entered urban schools
unprepared to grasp the material that was taught.80
(2) Impaired learning progress. Many students' out-of-school environments
were inimical to achievement as they continued through school. 8 '
(3) Impaired mental and emotional health. Statistics showed a much
greater incidence of mental health problems in inner-city schools than elsewhere, with results including lower intellectual functioning and withdrawn and
82
disruptive behavior.
be unalleviable, and had numerous poverty-related causes, including more frequent illness, lack of

warm clothing, family babysitting responsibilities, lack of parental encouragement to attend school,
lack of success in school, and impaired mental and emotional health. Id. at 24-26.
78.
79.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 35.

80. Some poverty-related urban conditions that contributed to impaired learning readiness were
lack of toys, books, and other materials in the home; lack of direct adult attention; lack of exposure to standard English; overcrowded living conditions; and excessive noise. Some in-school man-

ifestations of impaired learning readiness were unfamiliarity with books and writing materials: inability to make refined visual discriminations and recognize alphabet letters; failure to grasp
concepts such as color, time, sequence, and cause and effect; underdeveloped facility with language; low levels of curiosity; brief attention span; and underdeveloped memory skills. Id. at 35-36.

81. Some conditions of urban poverty which impeded academic progress were deficiencies in
food, clothing, medical care, and recreation; parental abandonment and abuse; exposure to violence and drug and alcohol abuse; overcrowding and excessive noise; frequent household moveslack of parental assistance or encouragement to learn; part-time employment; attitudes inimical to
school attendance and achievement; and disruptive pupils in school. Some of the academic conse-

quences of these conditions were failure to do homework; poor performance in school due to anxiety; lack of motivation to attend and achieve; interruption of sequential learning; narrow ranges of
out-of-school learning; and generally poor academic achievement. Id. at 38.40.
82. Id. at 42-43.
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(4) Impaired physical health. Children living in poverty were shown to be
subject more frequently to illness and injury, 3with consequent absence from
school and poor performance in the classroom.
(5) Handicapping conditions. Poverty was a cause for many city pupils'
learning difficult or impossible in
physical and mental handicaps, which made
84
the absence of expensive special services.
(6) Foreign language. Over 100,000 of the intervenor school districts'
using English; court decisions require
pupils could not participate effectively
85
bilingual education for these pupils.
(7) Occupational education. The large cities had higher than average prohad the
portions of pupils who would ultimately enter trades, and consequently
86
highest enrollments in costly occupational education programs.
(8) Absenteeism. The cities' high rates of absenteeism had the effect of inremedial asterrupting many pupils' progress, and made necessary 8 extensive
7
sistance as well as large numbers of attendance officers.
The court found finally that the failure of the intervenor school districts to
deal adequately with the eight educational overburdens, as a result in part of
their reduced state aid, had had a substantial effect on their pupils' academic
achievement."8 Most importantly, the court found that every year significant
numbers of urban pupils failed to achieve even basic minimal educational
skills.8 9 The large city districts consistently had by far the greatest proportions
of pupils scoring below minimum competency for their grade levels on national
achievement tests and state-administered reading and mathematics proficiency
tests. 90 Some New York City high school students were found to be totally illiterate, and thousands were below the state's own measures of minimum educational competency. 9 1 The evidence showed that underachieving pupils tended
83.
84.

Id. at 46, 48.
Id. at 49-56.

85. Id. at 56-58. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board
of Educ., 72 Civ. 40002 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 1974).
86. In the Buffalo schools occupational education cost $724 more per pupil than academic education. The higher cost of occupational education was due in part to large capital expenditures for
equipment, which must be maintained and replaced with advances in technology. Moreover, highly
skilled teachers and small classes were necessary, especially where tools and machinery were dangerous. Substantial numbers of interested students could not be offered occupational education on
account of the cost. In New York City approximately 15,000 students, or half the applicants for occupational education, were turned down each year. Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs-Intervenors), supra
note 33, at 59-60.
87. Id.at 61.
88. Id. at 34, 63.
89. Id. at 63-65.

90. On the Gates-MacGinitie Reading Test, administered in 1976, 16% of Rochester's twelfth
grade pupils scored at a fifth grade level or lower. In New York City, the proportion of ninth graders reading at fourth grade level or below on the Metropolitan Achievement Test was 14% in 1974,
9% in 1975, and 12% in 1976. Half the pupils who enter the ninth grade each year in New York
City eventually drop out of school. Id. at 63-64. The consequence of such a high drop-out rate is
that educational incompetence cannot adequately be measured by reference solely to the proportions of underachieving pupils within the school system. Id. at 63-64.
91. The New York State Pupil Evaluation Program tests were used to measure proficiency in
reading and mathematics of third, sixth, and ninth grade pupils across the state. Over 52% of the
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to fall further behind their grade levels as they passed through school. Pupils'
failure to acquire skills in the early grades rendered inaccessible much of the
upper grades' curriculum. 92 Remedial programs adequate to address the problems of great numbers of underachieving students were found to be too expensive for the intervenor districts to provide. 93
V
THE RODRIGUEZ DECISION

In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez94 the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Texas system of school financing against a
federal equal protection attack. Every school financing decision since
Rodriguez, including Levittown, has been shaped to some degree by the Supreme Court's ruling. 95 State courts that have struck down financing schemes
in the wake of Rodriguez have relied on state constitutional provisions, as to
which the federal law precedent of Rodriguez carries naught but persuasive
force. 9 6 The Levittown case was the first school financing adjudication in which
the scope of Rodriguez was examined in its own context, namely federal con97
stitutional law.

The Texas school financing scheme challenged in Rodriguez was similar in
structure and purpose to the New York system. 98 The state of Texas provided
almost half the school funds state-wide, and local school districts supplied most
of the rest. 99 State aid was apportioned according to a complex formula designed to take account of each school district's resources.' 0 0 Local contributions, however, differed sufficiently due to variations in property wealth to
negate much of the equalizing effect of the aid formula.' 0 1 The case presented
by the Rodriguez plaintiffs [hereinafter referred to as appellees] was much the
same as that presented by the original plaintiffs in the Levittown case.
pupils scoring below minimum competency as determined by the state's own standards were enrolled in the four intervenor school districts, which had just under 36% of the state's total school

enrollment. Each of the intervenor districts had between 25 and 35% more pupils scoring below
minimum competency than the rest of the state. When only inner city scores were compared with
the balance of the state, the gap was even wider. Id. at 64-65.

92. Id. at 65-66.
93. Id. at 67.
94. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
95. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 486-90, 303 A.2d 273. 279-82. cert. denied. 414

U.S. 976 (1973); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 640-50. 376 A.2d 359, 371-75 (1977).
96. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 295. cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 761-68, 557 P.2d 929, 948-53. 135 Cal. Rptr. 345,

364-69 (1976); cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 649, 376 A.2d
359, 374-75 (1977).
97. The only other post-Rodriguez school financing decision in which the federal equal protection clause was a ground for invalidation was Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., No. C73688
(Dist. Ct., Denver, Mar. 13, 1979).

98.

For a description of the New York system, see text accompanying notes 8-18 supra.

99.

411 U.S. at 9 n.21.

100. Id. at 9-10.
101.

Id. at 12-16.
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variations were attacked as violative of the federal equal
Interdistrict spending
02
protection clause.1
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Rodriguez examined the appellees'
claims on two levels of equal protection review. First was the strict scrutiny
standard, which itself divides into two distinct branches, labeled "suspect
class" and "fundamental rights." The second level of review was the rational
basis standard. On neither level did the Court find an equal protection violation.
Appellees claimed that the division of the state of Texas into school districts for financing purposes constituted an impermissible classification on the
basis of wealth. The majority found it unnecessary to determine even whether
classifications according to wealth are "suspect," for it found that appellees
had failed to prove any recognizable wealth discrimination.10 3 There was no evidence that poor persons were concentrated in districts low in property
wealth. 10 4 Nor was there evidence that the system absolutely deprived any
poor pupils of an education.10 5 Furthermore, if the class were defined as those
pupils residing in poor districts, it would lack the features of powerlessness and
required to activate the extraordinary protection of the strict
disability usually
06
scrutiny test. 1
On the fundamental rights branch of strict scrutiny analysis, appellees'
claims were again rejected. 10 7 To the appellees' claim that variations in school
spending constituted discrimination as to the fundamental right to education,
the Court responded that no fundamental right to education exists. 0 8 The only
rights sufficiently "fundamental" to trigger strict scrutiny are those which are
protected expressly by the Constitution or which can fairly be implied from its
text. 0 9 Education is not expressly guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and the majority was unwilling to interpret the rights to free speech and
102. The Rodriguez appellees did not rely on any provision of the Texas Constitution. Although
the state constitution contained an equal protection clause, TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3, and an educacation clause, id., art. VII, § 1, neither was raised in the Rodriguez litigation. It is likely that appellees decided to forego state constitutional claims to avoid an abstention ruling by the federal court.
See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
The Rodriguez appellees made no allegations regarding municipal overburden, regional variations
in purchasing power, or any other of the factual elements of the Levittown plaintiffs-intervenors'
case.

103. 411 U.S. at 28. The suspect class branch of strict scrutiny analysis prohibits state-imposed
classifications of persons according to certain particularly invidious criteria, notably race, absent
some compelling state interest. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
104. Id. at 23, 27.
105. Id. at 23-24.

106. Id. at 28.
107.

The fundamental rights branch of strict scrutiny analysis prohibits discrimination touching

on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, absent a compelling state interest requiring
such discrimination. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 113 (1973); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
108. 411 U.S. at 35.
109. Id. at 33.
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voting as implying a right to education."10 Justice Powell added that even were
such an inference made, appellees could not fairly claim that the Texas system
deprived pupils of the basic minimal skills necessary to exercise effectively
speech and voting rights."'
Having found the strict scrutiny test inapplicable in both of its embodiments, the Court considered appellees' equal protection claims on the more traditional "rational basis" level of review.' 12 The Court held that a rational justification existed for maintaining a financing system in which variations in
expenditures are permitted.' 13 The legislative purpose rationally promoted by4
the Texas arrangement was preservation of local control of public education.'
Justice Powell hypothesized that the people of Texas may have believed that a
more equalized system would require greater financial participation by the
state, and that "along with increased control of the purse strings at the state
level [would] go control over local policies. ' "" 5 The majority refused to interfere with that judgment. It found that the Texas system was neither irrational
to the point of being invidiously discriminatory nor was it the result of purposeful discrimination.'" 6 It was a "rough accommodation" of disparate interests
by a legislative body honestly attempting to narrow differences in spending
while preserving local control.
In its rational basis discussion the majority noted the implications of the
case for the relationship between national and state governments. The majority
cautioned that invalidation of the Texas system by the Supreme Court would
pose a threat to school financing systems in virtually all the states.11 7 The
Court explained that its concern with federalism was important not only to the
level of judicial review appropriate to the case but also to the question whether
there existed a rational basis for the challenged discrimination.1 18 Such dicta
render the Rodriguez decision peculiarly susceptible to an interpretation in
which the federalism balance was the Court's primary consideration. In this
view the Court assumed an especially deferential equal protection stance to
avoid intrusion into a field traditionally reserved to state and local authority.
110. Id. at 35-36.
I 11. Id. at 36-37.
112. Under this standard, legislative enactments enjoy judicial deference unless there exists no
rational basis for the classification of persons occasioned by them. See, e.g.. McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
113. 411U.S. at 55.
114. Freedom to decide to spend more on the education of one's children and local participation in decisions as to how the money will be spent are major components of local control. Id. at
49-50.
115. Id. at 51-53.

116. Id. at 55. The final consideration supporting deference to the legislature was the lack of
tested alternatives to the method of financing employed universally in the states at the time of
Rodriguez. Id.
117. "[Ilt would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal
system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public
education presently in existence in virtually every State." Id. at 44. The importance of the federalism question is evident from the majority's reiteration of its concern in the final paragraph of the
opinion. Id. at 58.
118. Id. at 44.
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If concern for the federal-state distribution of power is entitled to a great
deal of credit for the outcome of the case, Rodriguez may be more important
as a "forum allocation" decision than as an equal protection decision. That is,
the Supreme Court may have been saying more about the proper forum in
which to examine school financing than about the rules of decision appropriate
to the subject. In a similar lawsuit brought in state court, alleging violations of a
state equal protection clause, the equal protection analysis appropriately might
be more stringent. 119 Commentators widely preceived Rodriguez in this light.
The case was interpreted as spelling the end of federal constitutional adjudication in the school finance area, 20and as inaugurating a new era of state constitutional adjudication in the field.1
The Levittown court proved the commentators both right and wrong. In
Levittown, the trend toward state constitutional adjudication in school finance
was continued. The court confronted as well, however, the federal equal protection question, and made a considered determination that the Levittown facts
were sufficiently different from those in Rodriguez to warrant a contrary fourteenth amendment resolution. The Levittown court distinguished Rodriguez and
announced the reappearance of federal constitutional law in school financing
adjudication.
VI
THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS: ORIGINAL PLAINTIFFS

A. FederalEqual Protection
The original plaintiffs alleged that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids a state to allow the quantity and quality of educational services to be a function of district property wealth. The plaintiffs chose
not to press their federal equal protection claim in light of the United States
Supreme Court's resolution of the same legal issues in the Rodriguez case. The
119.

There are good reasons for assuming as well that state court analysis could be more strin-

gent than federal court analysis on the same federal equal protection questions. The argument is
that where federal courts decline to enforce a federal constitutional provision in certain contexts
due merely to institutional concerns, such as the federalism concern in Rodriguez, they do not

thereby limit the reach of the constitutional provision itself, but only of their own power of review.
If the same federal provision can be enforced by another body which is not bound by the same institutional concerns, the full reach of the constitutional provision may come into play. For example, state courts can enforce federal constitutional rights, but are not bound by the federalism con-

cerns which restrain the federal courts. Therefore, in a context such as school financing where a
federal court would exercise restraint on the federal equal protection question primarily out of deference to the states, a state court should be free to enforce the federal equal protection clause to
its fullest doctrinal extent. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underefnforced Constittutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
120. See, e.g., Dugan, The Constitutionality of School Finance Systems Under State Law: New
York's Turn, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 573, 573-74 (1976); 12 DuQ. L. REV. 989, 998-99 (1974); 76 W.
VA. L. REV. 72, 79 (1973-74); 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 90, 91 (1973); 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 88, 94-95 (1973);
but see Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill
Points the Way, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 365, 373-84 (1974); Carrington, Financing the American
Dream:Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1259 (1973).
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court therefore rejected the original plaintiffs' federal claim, noting that postRodriguez challenges like the plaintiffs'
have failed to the extent that they
2
relied on the fourteenth amendment. 1
B. State Equal Protection
The New York State Constitution contains an equal protection clause that
is nearly identical to its federal counterpart: "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."' 12 In contrast with the two-tiered federal equal protection review in Rodriguez,123 the
Levittown court utilized three distinct levels of review on the plaintiffs' state
equal protection claims. In addition to the strict scrutiny and rational basis
tests, the court applied an intermediate test, labeled the "sliding scale."
1. Strict Scrutiny
a. Suspect Class
In both New York and federal equal protection doctrine, strict scrutiny
analysis is divided into two separate tests, the "suspect class" and "fundamental rights" branches. Statutory classifications are stricken under the suspect
class branch if they are founded upon race or some other invidious criterion,
unless some compelling state interest justifies the discrimination.12 4 The original plaintiffs contended that the demonstrated correlation between the property
wealth of school districts and the wealth of district residents '2- - established
an
26
impermissible classification of persons on the basis of their wealth.'
The court declined to reach the wealth question. It considered the "classification" of the state into school districts merely a means by which a local
component of the financing system could be devised. The court viewed the creation of school districts as a legitimate delegation of a portion of the state's responsibility for education. Although variations in revenue-raising ability were
inescapable given local financing units, the state-supported component of the
financing system was intended to narrow such variations. It would have been
inappropriate for the court to invalidate the local component without examining
the state component if spending inequities were the result of failure by the state
component to perform its equalizing function. The court was unwilling to
isolate the act of dividing the state into local units from the state-furnished
component of the system for purposes of determining whether there was a suspect classification. 127 The court stated that it was reviewing only the validity of
121.
122.
123.

94 Misc. 2d at 519, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § 11.
See text accompanying notes 103-16 supra.

124. See Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326. 332, 348 N.E.2d 537. 543, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82, 87 (1976).

125. Although plaintiffs introduced evidence on this correlation, the court made no specific
finding of such a correlation. See Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law at 13, Board of Educ.,
Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
126. Id. at 13-14.
127. 94 Misc. 2d at 520, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
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the "end product" of the system as a whole.12 8
Even if the court had reached the suspect class question, the plaintiffs'
presentation would have failed to establish a violation for at least two reasons.
One barrier to the plaintiffs' challenge, which had proved dispositive for the
suspect class claims of the Rodriguez plaintiffs, 29 was the difficulty in the
school financing context of making any showing of wealth discrimination. The
intervening urban school districts had proved that the correlation between
property wealth and income level of residents was imperfect. These districts
combined the greatest concentrations of families below the poverty level with
the most valuable real property in the state.' 30 Moreover, even supposing the
correlation between income wealth and property wealth had been nearly perfect, wealth discrimination would have been an inappropriate claim. The isolated "wealthy" child living in a district with little property wealth would have
as much cause to complain of discrimination in school spending as would a
"poor" child in the same district. The class of persons harmed by the New
York scheme was all pupils in low-spending districts, and not only the poor
children of the state.
The other major hurdle for plaintiffs' suspect class claim would have been
the difficulty of persuading any court to add wealth classifications to the brief
list of classes deemed "suspect." Suspect classes in New York, according to
31
dicta by the Court of Appeals, include race, national origin, and alienage.1
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any New York State court has
held that wealth is a suspect class. 32 In a New Jersey school financing case,
Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that wealth is
not in all circumstances an invidious classification. "Wealth is not at all 'suspect' as a basis for raising revenues .... Obviously financial lack is a laudable
basis when a statute seeks to ameliorate poverty." 33 Although wealth is potentially an extremely invidious basis on which to classify persons, it is not so inherently repugnant as to have achieved widespread acceptance by the courts as
suspect.

128. Id.
129. 411 U.S. at 18-28.
130. 94 Misc. 2d at 494, 497, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 619-21.
131. Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 332, 348 N.E.2d 537, 543, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82, 87 (1976).
132. In each case where the United States Supreme Court has found wealth classifications in-

valid under the Equal Protection Clause, the discrimination has affected some fundamental interest.
See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 78 (1972) (access by candidates to ballots); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(right to appointed counsel in criminal appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to appeal from criminal conviction). The Supreme Court has rejected every challenge to wealth classifications where no established fundamental interest was involved. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
133. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 492, 303 A.2d 273, 283, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
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b. FundamentalRight
Apart from the suspect class doctrine, federal and New York courts direct
strict scrutiny to legislative classifications which limit some persons' exercise
of fundamental rights. 134 Only a compelling state interest may overcome the
equal protection guarantee in the fundamental rights context. In Rodriguez the
Supreme Court held that there exists no fundamental right to education., 3 - The
original plaintiffs in Levittown urged the court to interpret the state equal protection clause more broadly than the federal clause and to declare education a
fundamental right in New York. 136 The court rejected the claim without
analyzing the question; the New York Court of Appeals had previously decided
the issue in the negative, 137 and the Levittow~n court adhered to the prece138
dent.
A unanimous Court of Appeals had held in Matter of Levy that education
is not "such a 'fundamental constitutional right' as to be entitled to special
constitutional protection," citing Rodriguez.t 39 The Levy case was an equal
protection challenge to a New York statute granting free tuition, room, and
board to blind and deaf pupils at state boarding schools, but providing only free
tuition for all other handicapped pupils. The Court of Appeals emphasized that
handicapped children in New York do have a right to a free education pursuant
to the state constitution.1 40 Rejecting the claims that handicapped children form
a suspect class and that education is a "fundamental" right, the court applied
4
the rational basis test and upheld the classification.' 1
The original plaintiffs in Levittown contended that all references in Levy to
a right to education were dicta because Levy did not concern education.1 42 The
issue was not unequal tuition payments, but unequal provision for "maintenance expenses" at state boarding schools. The Levittown court was unwilling,
however, to dismiss so readily the Court of Appeals' expression on the right to
education. It interpreted the Levy decision as examining the difference between
an education that is wholly free and an education that is free except for room
and board expenses. Levy was therefore an education case, and the refusal to
grant fundamental right status to education was not dictum.1 43
134. See Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 332, 348 N.E.2d 537, 543, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82, 87-88 (1976). The court of appeals listed as fundamental rights under the strict scru-

tiny test voting, travel, procreation, free speech, appeal from criminal conviction, and, "perhaps,
the right of privacy." Id.
135. 411 U.S. at 35. See text accompanying notes 107-10 supra.

136. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, supra note 125, at 11-12.
137. Matter of Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 658, 345 N.E.2d 556, 558, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (1976). accord, Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 332-33, 348 N.E.2d 537, 543, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82, 88 (1976).
138. 94 Misc. 2d at 522, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636.

139. Matter of Levy, 38 N.Y.2d at 658, 345 N.E.2d at 558, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
140. Id. at 657, 345 N.E.2d at 558, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 15. For the right to education, the court of
appeals cited N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202(l); and Matter of Wiltwyck
School for Boys v. Hill, I1 N.Y.2d 182, 182 N.E.2d 268, 227 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1962).

141.

Matter of Levy, 38 N.Y.2d at 658, 345 N.E.2d at 558-59, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 15.

142.

Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memoranduar of Law, supra note 125. at 12-13.

143.

94 Misc. 2d at 522, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The court's reading of Lety comported with the
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In the event the Levittown case is reviewed in the Court of Appeals, 44 an
opportunity to reconsider Levy will be presented. The outcome of such a reconsideration would turn on a combination of factors. A number of points
would favor reversal of Levy. In Rodriguez the Supreme Court expressed its
test for determining whether education is fundamental as "whether there1 4is a
right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." s If
the same test were applied under the New York Constitution, the outcome
would be contrary 46to Levy, because a right to education is guaranteed in the
1
state constitution.
Another pertinent consideration is that education is uniquely bound to the
exercise of certain recognized fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and the right to vote. None of these rights can be exer147
cised effectively by an illiterate population.
Moreover, New York has been providing free education for its children
since 1849.148 The state constitution has protected the right to education since
1894.149 Public education is consistently the single largest item in the New
York State budget, exceeding three billion dollars in the 1978-79 school year.- 0
The state's own recognition of the paramount importance of education along
with the practical necessity for educational skills in contemporary society argue
in favor of its inclusion on the list of fundamental rights.'5'
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis supports allowing the Levy
holding to stand. The fundamental right question has been resolved once by the
Court of Appeals, and the justification must be substantial for the court even to
consider overturning its own ruling. In the present context, resort to the extraordinary step of overruling a previous decision would be pointless, for
overruling Levy would not alter the outcome of the Levittown case.
More to the point, when examining fundamental state constitutional rights,
the New York courts need not follow the United States Supreme Court's test
of "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 15 2 The test does
pose some difficulties when transported to the state constitutional environment.
Numerous rights are guaranteed by the New York Constitution which state
court of appeals' language throughout the Levy opinion. Reference was made repeatedly in Levy to

maintenance as a component education, and the issues were resolved as if education were at stake.
The Levittown court's reading of Levy coincided also with the institutional context of such educa-

tion. Because there were only six public schools for the deaf in the state, Matter of Levy at 659,
345 N.E.2d at 559, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 16, living at school was a practical requisite for attendance for
great numbers of eligible pupils.
144. The Levittown defendants filed notice of appeal to the Appellate Division, Second Department, of the New York Supreme Court on February 1, 1979.
145. 411 U.S. at 33-34.
146. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. See Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, supra note 125,
at 11-13.
147. This contention was rejected in Rodriguez. See note 110 supra.
148. See An Act Establishing Free Schools Throughout the State, 1849 N.Y. Laws, ch. 140, § I
(current version at N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202(l) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979)).
149. See N.Y. CONST. of 1849, art. IX, § I (current version at N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § I).
150. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1.
151. See Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, supra note 125, at 12.
152.

See note 145 supra.
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courts would understandably be reluctant to label "fundamental."

Among

these are the right of employees of public contractors to be paid local prevailing wage rates,1 5 3 the right to toll-free use of the Erie Canal,l s 4 and the right of
the people to authorize, by majority vote in a municipality, the conduct of

bingo games by bona fide religious, charitable, or non-profit organizations.ISS
More suitable methods for denominating fundamental rights for state equal protection purposes would be simply to adopt the rights elevated by the United
States Supreme Court to fundamental status, as opposed to adopting the Supreme Court's test, or to determine independently which rights shall be fundamental in New York.156 On balance, either of these alternatives would be superior to overruling Levy.
2.

IntermediateReview

The second level of review on which the original plaintiffs claimed a state
equal protection violation was the "sliding scale" test.S 7 This intermediate test
is the most recent addition to equal protection doctrine; it has been utilized by
the New York Court of Appeals only since 1975.158 In the principal case of
5 9 a reverse
Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center,1
discrimination challenge, the
Court of Appeals found both the strict scrutiny and rational basis levels of review inappropriate, and resorted to a "middle ground" test. 60 For authority,
the New York court cited several sex discrimination and other cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court purportedly on the rational basis standard,
but revealing, according to the Court of Appeals, a departure from traditional
153. N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 17.
154. Id. art. XV, § 3.
155. Id. art I, § 9(2). The bingo provision, as well as the provision guaranteeing local prevailing
wage rates for employees of public contractors, are in the "Bill of Rights" article of the New York
Constitution.
156. One candidate for a fundamental rights standard independent of the Rodriguez test is the
standard formerly utilized by the Supreme Court to define "fundamental rights" in the context of
fourteenth amendment due process. In its delineation of the conceptual boundaries of the word
"liberty" in the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court early determined that only rights which
are "fundamental" should be included. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78. 106 (1908); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Justice Cardozo characterized such fundamental rights as
those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319. 325 (1937).
Justice Frankfurter spoke of rights "basic to our free society," repeating as well the Cardozo formulation. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Countering the objection that such a vague
standard leaves judges free to apply wholly subjective notions of what is fundamental, Justice
Frankfurter declared that judges applying the standard are bound by "considerations deeply rooted
in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 171 (1952). In Justice Harlan's words, judges must "attempt to define [liberty) in a way that
accords with American traditions and our system of government." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 176 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
157. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, supra note 125, at 19-20.
158. See Matter of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 577-78, 331 N.E.2d 486, 493. 370 N.Y.S.2d
511, 520-21 (1975). Cf. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 61, 340 N.E.2d 444, 456, 378
N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 (1975) (court of appeals recognized the sliding scale test but found it inapplicable).
159. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
160. Id. at 334-36, 348 N.E.2d at 544-46, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90.
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doctrine. 161 Despite the Supreme Court's failure to adopt expressly a third
standard for equal protection review, it was nonetheless that Court's decisions, 16 2 along with analysis of their implications for equal protection doctrine
in key dissents by Justice Marshall,1 63 which prompted the New York Court of
Appeals to accept the new standard.
The middle level of review, as applied in Alevy, involves two steps. First
the reviewing court must determine whether the challenged discrimination
satisfies a substantial state interest. If it does, the court must determine
whether the state interest could be achieved by some less
objectionable
1 64
alternative means, requiring less or perhaps no discrimination.
The Levittown court began its middle level inquiry by identifying the governmental interest that the discriminatory financing scheme was designed to
satisfy, namely the fulfillment of the state's obligation under the constitution to
" 'provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.' ",16s Included
161. Id. at 334, 348 N.E.2d at 544, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89; citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
162. See cases cited in note 161 supra.
163. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-99 (dissenting opinion); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (dissenting opinion). Although the court
of appeals in Alevy quoted the dissenting opinions of Justice Marshall, the intermediate test applied in Alevy must be distinguished from the "sliding scale" associated with Justice Marshall.
Justice Marshall envisioned a "spectrum of standards" ranging from strict scrutiny at one extreme
to the rational basis test at the other. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 98-99 (dissenting opinion). The New York Court of Appeals in Alevy, by contrast, adopted
a single intermediate test, lying somewhere between strict scrutiny and the rational basis test, and
did not use the label "sliding scale." 39 N.Y.2d at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545-46, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
The Levittown court meticulously applied the "middle level" test outlined in Alevy. but referred to
the test as "the so-called sliding scale approach." 94 Misc. 2d at 525, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638. The
term "sliding-scale" has not been used by Justice Marshall himself, but was coined by Professor
Gerald Gunther. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 17-18
(1972).
164. Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545-46, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 90. There is no compelling reason to apply the Alevy dual-step approach in all cases
where middle level review is appropriate. The Alevy decision can be read to intend its dual-step inquiry to be useful only or primarily in reverse discrimination cases. Id. A somewhat less confined
mode of analysis is suggested in New York's first case involving intermediate review: "a realistic
examination of the conflicting policies and interests involved in the challenged statute-without the
straitjacket of the two-tier approach with its 'tired formulations' and 'stock responses.' - Matter of
Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 577-78, 331 N.E.2d 486, 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 521 (1975).
Adopting the Alevy dual-step method in all applications of middle level review might amount
merely to exchanging one straitjacket for another.
165. 94 Misc. 2d at 523, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The court accepted the substantiality of the governmental interest without any expression to that effect. There can be no doubt that obeying the
constitutional command to provide a free school system rises above the level of a permissive legislative interest at least to the level of a substantial interest.
The court did not inquire whether the state interest satisfied by the discriminatory treatment
might be some interest other than the "overarching interest" advanced by the statute as a whole.
The court apparently concluded that the legislature's interest in fulfilling its constitutional obligation subordinated all other interests.
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within that purpose, according to the court, was provision of equal educational
opportunity. 166167An additional purpose was to remedy inequalities in educational
opportunities.
Summarizing its findings of fact as to the original plaintiffs, the court indicated that although the state aid formula was designed to satisfy the substantial
state interest of providing a free public school system for all the children of the
state, it did so in a discriminatory manner. 68 The court therefore found it necessary to inquire whether a less1 69objectionable alternative existed by which the
statutory purpose could be met.
The court noted that numerous states have reformed their school financing
systems in recent years to achieve greater equality.' 70 Moreover, the evidence
showed that in New York less objectionable alternatives had been studied and
proposed in detail by special committees, task forces, consultants, and the Regents of the State University.' 7' The picture presented by the court contrasted
sharply with the Rodriguez Court's assertion in 1973 that "the alternatives proposed are only recently conceived and nowhere yet tested."'172 The Levittown
court expressly disclaimed any intention of commenting on the constitutionality
of any of the alternatives. The court concluded only that
the aid system failed
73
to meet the intermediate test of state equal protection.1
3. Rational Basis
The third level of equal protection review applied by the court to the original plaintiffs' case was the rational basis test. The rational basis doctrine can
be characterized as a constitutional ban on arbitrary statutory classifications.
Where some persons are treated differently from others by legislative enactments, the distinctions must bear a rational relation to the purpose of the legislation. 174 The plaintiffs claimed that the system's unequal treatment of pupils in
various school districts was not rationally related to achievement of the stat17 ute's objectives.
The court found merit in the plaintiffs' claim. In order to emphasize the
lack of any rational correlation between the statute's discrimination and the
statutory purpose, the court restated the legislative purpose as remedying in166.

Id.

167. The court had pointed to this statutory purpose in the preceding portion of its opinion:
"Implicit in the long history of state aid to education has been the state's recognition that additional financing over and above that generated by local tax revenues was needed in order for the
state to discharge its constitutional obligation." Id. at 520. 408 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
168. Id. at 523-24, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
169. Id. at 524, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 525, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
172. 411 U.S. at 55.
173. 94 Misc. 2d at 525, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
174. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41. 61. 340 N.E.2d 444. 456. 378 N.Y.S.2d 1. 18
(1975); Matter of Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 88, 286 N.E.2d 432. 434. 335 N.Y.S.2d 33. 36-37
(1972).
175. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, supra note 125. at 20.
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equalities in educational opportunities.1 76 The legislature's recognition that such
a remedial purpose was a corollary to its "overarching interest" in providing a
free school system was shown by the state's long history of providing additional state aid for districts low in property wealth.' 77 The court concluded that
the overall operation of the aid statute perpetuated rather than remedied inequalities among school districts, and therefore failed to satisfy, and even ran
counter to, the statute's purpose. The aid formula's operation enabled districts
high in property wealth to exceed appreciably the guaranteed minimum expenditure of 12 hundred dollars per pupil. Flat grants of state aid enabled wealthy
districts to spend even more. Moreover, "save harmless" restrictions allowed
district spending to remain constant when declining enrollments would have re17 8
quired a reduction in state aid on the terms of the primary formula.
The court refused to follow the approach proposed by defendants of justifying the discriminatory impact of the system as a whole by the independent
rationality of each of its numerous parts. It may be true that discrete elements
of the statute, including even the flat grant and save harmless provisions, are
not discriminatory and are rationally related to legitimate purposes in isolation.
The court repeated, however, that the discriminatory operation of the statute
as a whole had been challenged, and that no rational relation between the overall discriminatory effect and the statute's equalizing purpose could be found.179
The court's rejection of a piecemeal review of each component of the
financing scheme may explain the omission of the question of local control
from its rational basis and sliding scale inquiries. A legislative interest in local
control of public schools would be an appropriate defense only to a challenge
directed specifically to the state's delegation of taxing and spending responsibility to the school districts. Such an attack would encompass only the local component of the financing system. Although the original plaintiffs did raise such a
challenge, the court rejected it on grounds that the state had broad discretion in
designing the individual components of a financing system so long as the
scheme as a whole was not impermissibly discriminatory.18 0 The court no
longer had occasion to consider a state interest in local control because it had
specifically upheld discretion to delegate taxing authority to school districts,
and any such interest was therefore satisfied.
C. The State Education Article
The education article of the New York Constitution provides, "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated."'" The original plaintiffs claimed that the legislature's delegation of financing responsibility
to the school districts was an abdication of its obligation under the education
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

94 Misc. 2d at 526, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
See note 167 supra.
94 Misc. 2d at 526-27, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
Id. at 527, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
Id. at 527-28, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 639-40.
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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article.182 Although the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim attacking delegation
to school districts, it held the statute inadequate to fulfill the state's ultimate
responsibility for the "end product" of the system.' 83 The statute's shortcoming was not delegation, but delegation without
adequate recognition of the dis1 84
tricts' varying revenue-raising capabilities.
The court's conclusion that the state is ultimately responsible for any discrimination in the financing system flowed inexorably from the constitution's
education mandate. All public educational services are provided pursuant to
the state's constitutional obligation under the education article; school districts
are merely arms of the state, furnishing services on its behalf. School districts
owe their existence to the state1 85 and can raise revenues only by virtue of the
state's delegation to them of authority to tax.1 86 The state and local components of school funding, therefore, are indistinguishable from a constitutional
viewpoint. Both are provided by "the state" although the local component is
raised by specialized agencies of the state, the school districts. The state's contribution to public schools is not limited to "state aid," which is distributed in
proportion to each district's inability to raise funds itself. Rather the state's
contribution is the combined totals from the state and local components of the
system, which sums vary dramatically in proportion to property wealth. In the
court's view the vast discrepancies in school spending were inconsistent with
the mandate of the education article. 18 7 The responsibility for remedying discrimination in school spending does not lie with the poorer school districts, but
with the state. The state must either compel such districts to raise greater revenues, or fill the deficiency itself.18 8
VII

TiH COURT'S CONCLUSIONS: PLAINTIFFS-INTERVENORS
A. State Equal Protection
The plaintiffs-intervenors' equal protection claims were predicated entirely
on the irrationality of the financing scheme.' 8 9 The court found that the
intervenors' aid was reduced by municipal overburden, reduced purchasing
power, the attendance measure of school population, and the weighting system
for special need pupils.' 90 It concluded that the statutory scheme had created
by its operation a classification of large urban districts and had discriminated
182.

Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, supra note 125, at 28-30.

183. 94 Misc. 2d at 527-28, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 639-40, quoting Robinson v. Cahill. 62 N.J. 473,
513, 303 A.2d 273, 294, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1972).
184. Id. at 528, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
185. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 1501, 1504 (McKinney 1969).
186. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1306 (McKinney 1972).
187. 94 Misc. 2d at 528, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
188. Id., citing Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 513, 303 A.2d 273, 294, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973).
189. The intervenors made no allegations regarding a fundamental right to education or a suspect classification, nor did they propose a sliding-scale inquiry.
190. See notes 63-93 supra.
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against the class. The court found no rational relation between such a classification and the statute's equalizing purpose.1 91

It is difficult to imagine any legislative purpose that could remotely be
served by treating the cities differently on the basis of such unintended drains
on fiscal capacity as municipal overburden, caused by the cities' greater inexorable needs for municipal services, and reduced purchasing power, caused by
regional cost variations. It is especially difficult to imagine any way the New
York statute's purpose of remedying district inequities could be advanced by
such discrimination. Given a striking instance of urban-suburban economic disparity, therefore, the doctrinal difficulties in a "municipal overburden case"
like the intervenors' are minimal. There is no need for challengers to invoke
strict scrutiny or the sliding scale, and the irrationality of the effect of noneducational factors on school spending is virtually undeniable. The intervenors'
case demonstrates that the principal difficulties in making out an overburden
case are factual; it must be shown that an imprecise measure of urban districts'
fiscal capacity results in a loss of aid, and that the loss is significant.
B. FederalEqual Protection
The intervenors stated their federal equal protection claim in tandem with
their state equal protection claim; 192 therefore the two were identical. An important preliminary question was whether the Supreme Court's decision in
Rodriguez barred the federal claim. In Rodriguez the Supreme Court found that
a legislative interest in preserving local control of public schools was rationally
promoted by a school financing system that had some discriminatory impact.1 93
The intervenors' rationale for distinguishing Levittown from Rodriguez
rested on differences in the type of challenge asserted in each case. The
Rodriguez appellees, like the original Levittown plaintiffs, had attacked the
Texas statute's inadequate provision for poorer districts. The Levittown
intervenors, however, challenged only the application of a financing scheme already oriented to fiscal capacity. The intervenors demanded only that the New
York system more rationally distribute its equalizing aid by more accurately
measuring fiscal capacity. The intervenors acknowledged that state aid in New
York assists poor districts. They claimed only that the wrong districts had been
designated as poor districts. In contrast with the Rodriguez appellees' "direct
attack on the way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse state and
local tax revenues, ' 1 94 the Levittown intervenors sought a modification in the
aid formula's measure of local capacity and burdens in education. 9 5
A complicating factor was the New York Court of Appeals' ruling nearly
191. 94 Misc. 2d at 530, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
192. The intervenors concluded their single equal protection presentation with the allegation
that the system violated both the state and federal equal protection clauses. Pre-Trial Memorandum
for Plaintiffs-Intervenors, supra note 125, at 54.
193. 411 U.S. at 51-53. For a summary of the Rodriguez facts and holdings, see text accompanying notes 94-116 supra.
194. 411 U.S. at 40.
195. See Pre-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiffs-Intervenors at 66-68, Board of Educ., Levittown
Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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three decades earlier, in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation,196 that the
coverage of the state and federal equal protection clauses is identical.19 7 The
Dorsey case can be interpreted as barring any interpretation of the New York
equal protection clause that is more expansive than the prevailing interpretation
of the federal clause. If Rodriguez proved fatal to the intervenors' federal
claim, the court's finding of a state equal protection violation would have been
precluded by the Dorsey principle.
The Levittown court held that Rodriguez was distinguishable. 98 The court
found a federal equal protection violation in precise conformity with the state
equal protection violation. 199 The Dorsey principle of coincidence between federal and state equal protection was not disturbed. The court acknowledged,
citing Matter of Levy, 20 0 that the Rodriguez decision was authority for the
proposition that education is not a fundamental constitutional right for equal
protection purposes. 20 1 In the court's view, however, the Rodriguez decision
did not preclude subsequent applications of the rational basis standard to deter20 2
mine whether financing discrimination violates the fourteenth amendment.
The Rodriguez majority's rational basis holding was addressed to the facts
presented in that case,2 0 3 and the Levittown court perceived it as limited to
those facts. 20 4 The Levittown court had little difficulty making its rational basis
determination; it had already concluded that under the state constitution the
challenged discrimination bore no rational relation to the statute's purpose.2 05
It is not clear whether the court relied upon the distinction between Levittown
and Rodriguez suggested by the intervenors.20 6 It is certain only that the court
viewed the facts before it as different from those in Rodriguez, and that it
could find no rational relationship between discrimination against urban districts and the statute's purpose.
Although the Levittown trial court did not question the vitality of the
Rodriguez decision in the context of the traditional school finance claims of the
sort raised by the original plaintiffs, 20 7 it did recognize a new class of federal
constitutional claims in the school financing field. Due to the utter lack of rationality in financing discrimination traceable to municipal overburden and regional cost variations, the Levittown court showed that the rational basis test of
federal equal protection doctrine is still available to urban plaintiffs and perhaps others, consistent with the Rodriguez ruling. A renewed round of federal
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949).
Id. at 530, 87 N.E.2d at 548.
94 Misc. 2d at 531, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641-42.
Id. at 532, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642. See text accompanying notes 210-13 supra.
38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976).
Id. at 531-32, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642. See notes 137-41 supra.
94 Misc. 2d at 531-32, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
411 U.S. at 54-55. By contrast, the Rodriguez holding that education is not a fundamental

right was not intended to be limited to the facts of that case. See id. at 35.
204.
205.
206.

94 Misc. 2d at 531, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641-42.
Id. at 532, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
See text accompanying notes 193-95 supra.

207. The original plaintiffs raised but did not press a claim that the financing system violated
the Equal Protection Clause. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
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equal protection litigation in the school financing field could result from the
success of the plaintiffs-intervenors in New York. 20 8 Any such federal constitutional litigation is likely to occur in state courts, due to the desirability of
including various state constitutional claims in any school financing complaint.
As a result, any state court decisions on federal claims of the Levittown type
are likely to be immune from Supreme Court review because of adequate and
independent state grounds of decision. 20 9 The prospect raised by the Levittown
case, therefore, is the development of a new body of federal constitutional law
on municipal overburden and related concepts, developed entirely by state
courts and not subject to Supreme Court review. The potential for independent
development of federal constitutional law by state courts has always existed in
the federal system. State courts have always been bound, as are the federal
courts, to enforce the Constitution of the United States. No strictly statedeveloped federal constitutional law, however, has arisen. As a result of the
Supreme Court's resolution of the Rodriguez case, school financing became a
pioneer field for development of state constitutional rights. 210 It is conceivable
that school financing will be the context for another innovation in constitutional
litigation: protection of federal constitutional rights on the basis of doctrines
developed solely in state courts.
C. The State Education Article
The intervenors' presentation on the education article21 1 was even more
compelling than that of the original plaintiffs, for the intervenors introduced evidence, which the court accepted, 212 that significant numbers of pupils in the
urban school districts had failed to acquire basic minimal educational skills. In
its analysis upholding the intervenors' claim, the court began by noting that the
education article has been interpreted to assure every child in New York an educational program that is appropriate to the child's needs. 213 The court added
208.

Less than nine months after the Levittown ruling, a state court in Colorado invalidated that

state's school financing law on both state and federal equal protection grounds. Lujan v. Colorado
State Bd. of Educ., No. C73688 (Dist. Ct., Denver, Mar. 13, 1979); see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 14,
1979, § A, at 16, col. 6.
209. Under the doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds, the United States Supreme

Court is without jurisdiction to review a state court judgment which rests on both state and federal
grounds, if the state ground is adequate to support the judgment independently of the federal
ground. See, e.g., Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 489 (1965); Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
210. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
211. For the text of the relevant portion of the New York Constitution's education article, see
text accompanying note 181 supra.
212. Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs-Intervenors), supra note 33, at 63-65. See text accompanying
note 89 supra.
213. This proposition was first relied upon in a lower court decision establishing the right to

free education for handicapped children in New York. Matter of Downey, 72 Misc. 2d 772, 773,
340 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (Fam. Ct. 1973). In Downey, the court granted the petitioning handicapped

child the difference between the cost of the child's tuition, $6496, and the two thousand dollars in
state aid the child had been receiving. Id. at 773, 775, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 689, 690. The Downey principle was endorsed by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345
N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976). In that case, the court of appeals declared, "There can be no

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

1978-1979]

SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM

that the state's historical concern for providing free education, a concern much
older than the constitution's education article itself,21 4 compelled the conclusion that the article guarantees to school children equal opportunity to acquire
basic minimal educational skills. 215 Because the need for aid was greatest in the
intervenor districts, where there were disproportionate numbers of underachieving pupils, the assurance of equal opportunity to acquire basic skills required in the court's view greater than average expenditures in those districts. 2 16 The state's provision of reduced aid per pupil and reduced
supplemental aid per pupil with special needs did not assure intervenor pupils
an equal chance to acquire minimal skills. In the court's words, supplying reduced aid to the most needy pupils was "tantamount to excluding those many
under-achieving pupils from the educational program. ' 21 7 Such an exclusion vi218
olated their constitutional right to education.
The court's holding that the education article was violated raises the question whether spending levels have anything to do with educational achievement. If there is no relation between money and pupil achievement, the court's
conclusion is surely misplaced. Some degree of correlation between spending
and achievement must exist; failure by the state to make any provision for public schools would constitute a complete failure to assure opportunities to attain
basic skills. An indication of the importance of spending beyond merely providing schools was the attitude of administrators and teachers in high-spending
school districts toward the costly benefits which their districts were in a position to provide. At the Levittown trial several professionals from wealthy districts testified to the genuine educational value of such benefits as advanced
placement programs, small classes (particularly
in remedial programs), and ex21 9
tended foreign language instruction.
Moreover, money is almost universally regarded as a benefit, especially
when it is given to public service institutions such as schools. No evidence before the court indicated that any school district had ever returned unused any
part of its operating aid to the state. It would be disingenuous for wealthy districts to justify their monopoly on high spending levels by asserting that money
makes no difference.
D.

Equal Protection and Equal Educational Opportunity

On the intervenors' education article claim, the Levittown court determined that the state aid statute failed to provide pupils equal opportunity to acquire basic minimal educational skills. 220 In its final holding, the court condoubt that a handicapped child has a right to a free education in the State of New York. The
handicapped child is further assured such free specialized educational training as may be required." Id. at 657-58, 345 N.E.2d at 558, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (citations omitted).
214. The State of New York had been providing tuition-free public schools for 45 years when
the constitution's education article was adopted in 1894. See notes 148-49 supra.
215. 94 Misc. 2d at 532-33, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
216. Id. at 533, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 534, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
219. Findings of Fact (Plaintiffs), supra note 9. at 39, 45-50, 53.
220. See note 216 supra.
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cluded that the demonstrated denial of educational opportunity was sufficient
to establish a violation of the state and federal equal protection provisions as
well. 22 1 The court found that the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision was not
to the contrary. 222 The Rodriguez majority noted that the record in that case
did not establish a failure by the State of Texas to make available basic minimal skills. 223 In Levittown, by contrast, the court found that great concentrations of urban pupils were seriously deficient in minimal skills, and were therefore denied an opportunity for meaningful participation in the educational
program. 224 Without referring to any particular level of equal protection review, the Levittown court declared that the system's effective exclusion of
pupils deficient in basic skills was an impermissible discrimination, violative of
22
both the New York and federal equal protection clauses. The least that the state and federal constitutions can require of a statewide
public school system is that it make some education available for all of its intended beneficiaries. It is baldly irrational for the state to direct the highest levels of expenditure to non-urban districts while significant numbers of urban
pupils do not receive an adequate education.
VIII
REMEDIES

The Levittown court limited its relief as to both groups of plaintiffs to a
judgment declaring the school finance system unconstitutional. 226 The court retained jurisdiction of the action for an unstated interval to afford the legislature
an opportunity to remedy the system. 227 The court noted that there is no lack
of knowledge on the subject of more equitable alternatives to the present system, nor of proposals for reform addressed specifically to the New York system, generated from within and without state government. 228 The court expressly withheld
comment on the appropriateness of any particular alternative
229
for New York.
The primary difficulty with enacting any equalizing reform in public education is the practical political consideration, for most state legislators, tl~t
voting for a reduction of school aid for their home districts would diminish
their chances for reelection. Equalizing revisions are, as a rule, politically feasible only if all districts throughout the state receive at least some increase in
aid. A revision of the New York system sufficient to comply with constitutional requirements, however, would necessitate either a massive infusion of
221. 94 Misc. 2d at 534-35, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643-44.
222. Id. at 534, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643-44.
223. 411 U.S. at 37.
224. 94 Misc. 2d at 535, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
225. Id.
226. Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 525-37,
408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 638-45 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
227. Id. at 535-37, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45.
228. 94 Misc. 2d at 536, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
229. Id.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

1978-1979]

SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM

additional state funds for poorer districts, or a drastic paring of wealthy districts' aid, or a combination of the two, i.e., a less than massive but
nonetheless hefty infusion of new money for the poorer districts, coupled with
a reduction of state aid for only the wealthiest of the state's school districts.
The great virtue of a judicial declaration like that in Levittown is that legislators can take advantage of it to justify votes that adversely affect or do not
benefit their constituents' schools. Representatives can insist that the sole
alternative to legislative reform is court-ordered redistribution of funds following a judicial determination that the legislature has proceeded too slowly or in
bad faith. Although even a declaratory judgment might be insufficient to bend
the most stubborn representatives from the wealthiest districts, the weight of
judicial authority is likely to sway others whose constituents have nothing to
lose from reform but who would ordinarily oppose it out of political partisanship or out of consideration for colleagues in the legislature.
The Levittown defendants asserted in their answer that -[t]hese complaints
ought to be addressed to the Legislature for redress." 23 0 The court ultimately
did not dispute the defendants' assertion. Rather it implied that when legislative
majorities consistently oppose a constitutionally compelled resolution of a difficult problem of distribution, the pressure of a judicial declaration may be necessary to effect appropriate legislative action. It was the court's duty to remind
members of the State Senate and Assembly, however forcefully it deemed necessary, that the only alternatives available to them are a financing system that
is compatible with the constitutions, or no system at all.

Ix
CONCLUSION
The Levittown court displayed a remarkable degree of sensitivity and judicial craftsmanship in a case involving a mountain of complex evidence and a
number of delicate legal questions. The court was presented with, and decided,
two cases at once. The original group of plaintiffs presented a "traditional"
school financing case, challenging the relationship between property wealth and
school spending. The court followed the post-Rodriguez trend in school finance
litigation and resolved the traditional claims on state constitutional grounds,
citing violations of the equal protection and education guarantees. The
plaintiffs-intervenors presented a more novel "municipal overburden" case,
challenging the state's measure of fiscal capacity for apportionment of state
operating aid. The court found state constitutional violations as alleged by the
intervenor cities, and initiated a new trend as well on their claims. It found federal equal protection violations in both the irrationality of discrimination
against the large cities and the denial of equal educational opportunity in those
cities, where many pupils failed to attain even basic minimal skills.
The school finance litigation "score" currently stands even: eight cases for

230. Verified Answer at 12, Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94
Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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plaintiffs and eight cases for defendants. 2 3 ' An examination of the chronology
reveals that five 232 of the eight decisions upholding financing systems came
down in the four years following the Rodriguez ruling. The Rodriguez case cast
a pall on school finance litigation nationwide, a pall that recently has been
lifting. Plaintiffs have prevailed in the three most recent decisions. 233 Moreover, in the two most recent cases, 234 courts have distinguished Rodriguez and
based their rulings in part on the fourteenth amendment. The success of recent
challenges can be attributed partially to the sophistication of plaintiffs, who
have learned from their predecessors' mistakes. Of greater importance, though,
has been the fundamental soundness of the claims brought against outmoded
financing systems.
DENNIS E. BIRES
231. See notes 2 & 5 supra.
232. Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389,
212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d
178 (1974); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9,
554 P.2d 139 (1976).
233. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. v. Essex, No. A7602725 (Ct. of C.P., Hamilton County, Dec. 5,
1977); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408
N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., No. C73688 (Dist. Ct.,
Denver, Mar. 13, 1979).
234. Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408
N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., No. C73688 (Dist. Ct.,
Denver, Mar. 13, 1979).
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